Team and Organizational Case Study in High Risk
It is important to recognize that there seems to be very little feedback information and analysis to organizations with high risk tolerance and long years in the field. However, risk analysis and strategic objectives should be constantly scrutinized and laid before the Father. Each team has unique risk factors. At present, much of the training and approach to risk analysis and mitigation and security training seems to advise a "one size fits all" and that is definitely not good stewardship.
Please consider using the following case study as a reflective mirror for your own team and organizational practices. The glory of God is enhanced when we are good stewards of ourselves, His people, and the additional physical and non-physical resources entrusted to us. The purpose of sharing this case study is for self and organizational reflection, not to point fingers or make fellow brothers and sisters look bad.
This case study is a true experience occurring in the past 3 years. Details that would reveal the unreached people group and the location in the CAME/NA region have purposefully not been revealed, but enough data shared so as to demonstrate the failures and successes of a team in a high-risk situation as well as the role their high-risk tolerance sending organization played in their team's experience.
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The team was sent to a closed country where the organization had no first-hand experience specifically in that country. Few countries have diplomatic ties to this country. The team was not given a satellite phone or any secure way of communicating with leadership or security people outside the country. The team was comprised of the only known Western expatriates working in that country. While the team did have appropriate security training and contingency plans, they had no agreed upon specific protocol for the pull out. There was no systematic reporting of security changes arranged for prior to the team’s entrance into the new country.
The team comprised of a mature team leader couple with more than a decade in the region. The husband had demonstrated a calm demeanor, not easily frightened and not given to mood swings during the entire previous decade he had served with the organization.
There had been a several exploratory trips and there were some security concerns, but nothing was specifically addressed by the organization. Additionally, there were two more units, one with prior language/overseas experience, and one with a year of overseas life in the region. Both were single, with no other family members to consider.
Two months in on an exploratory extended stay, the team leader experienced a security threat from a local family that had served as a host family to the team. He was physically assaulted and threatened. The team leader and upper leadership evaluate the threat, and made the decision to stay in country at that time. Nothing else happened at that time as a direct result of the threat. The entire team left the country to prepare to return on different visas and for a more long term status.
Four months after re-entry to the country there were a series of political and terroristic events that began significant deterioration in the local security situation. These major developments were increasing tensions and leading to more conflict between the federal and local powers (which have historically been in strong opposition to one another). The team experienced a direct security event 6 months after the re-entry in-country. The event had a ripple effect, resulting in greater attention by higher ups in the national government, including a court case.
As the case continued to grow, there were increasing threats against the team, specifically those involved in the security event in month 6. By month 8, there still had been very limited communication with the organizational security team outside of the country, because the team leader thought that he was being followed, his phone lines tapped, and that electronic communications (Skype, email) were not secure. However, he asked the security team to please help him - they wanted to pull out. His landlord and friends were telling him stories of specific abuses conducted by the security forces in this country.
The team leader was told by his landlord and now legal representative to check his car for bombs before getting in the car. He was told to practice additional security inside and around the perimeter of the compound. Additionally, graphic violent descriptions were told to him by locals of what might be done to him and his extended family by these evil security forces, based on previous experiences locals had been through. He was told a specific story of a local who just simply disappeared one day when on a picnic at the river, related to the increasing tensions in the area between federal and local powers. He assumed the story was told to him to indicate how the local-federal feud was escalating in severity. A local friend who had demonstrated interest in spiritual things now publicly denigrated the team leader, made threats against him and his extended family, and threatened to undermine their court proceedings.
The organizational security team had no idea things were spiraling out of control due to the lack of available secure communication technology. The team leader tried to explain to the team that things were going badly, but did not feel comfortable explaining all the specifics. Some team members viewed the team leader as being paranoid, but that team member had already demonstrated a lack of security awareness, by not following security protocols that had been agreed upon because they viewed them as too restrictive.
For example, some routinely went out by themselves without any colleague at night after 10 pm, and not even informing their colleagues of their leaving the residence. When the team leader attempted to initiate evacuation protocols and said it was time to leave as soon as possible, he faced extensive scrutiny and questioning from up-line leadership. There were organizational procedures and policies that hindered a more rapid exit. Instead of trusting the field leader’s decision to commence with an evac immediately (and provide immediate outside support, as requested, during the process), there was added stress of company bureaucracy which further delayed the exit and more unsecure electronic communications which posed an additional threat to the security of the team.
Pre-established communication protocols were not followed, including which key individuals were supposed to be looped into all emergency and security-related communications. Several of those people happened to be traveling (in various different locations) or busy with previously scheduled work, thus were not unified in their communication and processing of the crisis situation. Some were not copied on communication which the team leader assumed would be relayed to them.
[Leaving out many more details] The effect was an extremely disorganized and disjointed emergency response from outside organization personnel. There were extensive communication breakdowns because the team leader was trying to communicate in a subtle, indirect manner with the assumption that all external communications were being compromised, sometimes attempting to employ a drastic, last-ditch strategy of sending out some misinformation and trying to communicate in code language (which had not been pre-established in the security procedures.
For example, messaging the code word “river” could mean evacuation route A by car on a certain highway to the destination of a certain city out of the higher risk area). Due to the lack of effective response from the organization, the team leader began to seek additional assistance from other people outside the organization.
The end result was a delayed evacuation, during which the team leader began to break down under the compounding acute stress. Whereas a well-coordinated evacuation response according to the team leader’s initial request would have cost less than $6,000, in the final aftermath, the organizational and human costs were many times greater.
Team Failures:
In spite of compromised electronic communications, the team leader should have risked earlier more direct and blunt communications with up-line leadership and security group.
Perhaps the team leader should have accepted an earlier “defeat” in the court case, though that would have jeopardized the team’s longer-term status in the country.
Teammates were also slow and initially resistant to respond to the team leaders’ decision to initiate evacuation protocols because some were unaware of the risks (they weren’t personally present during multiple significant conversations and situations), and no one wanted to have to leave at that time.
The team leader, and entire team, should have more strenuously insisted upon certain minimal security provisions from the organization (that were not provided).
The team over time had become relaxed in regards to some basic security practices as they became more comfortable living in the country.
Organizational Failures:
The organization assumed the culture and security profile was the same as other locations in the country.
The upper-level leadership and regional security personnel never visited the team in country.
The leadership never visited the team leader couple face-to-face to debrief and hear their side of the story before firing them.
Afterwards, the organization field leadership only communicated with this team leader couple very briefly via email and Skype, never once bringing the couple to headquarters.
They wounded this family, which are taking awhile to heal.
The organization’s security training and field security preparedness are 5-10 years behind current best practices in the industry.
Team Successes:
The team leader got everyone out alive.
The team leader worked hard to preserve the possibility of returning by trying to maintain good relations with their landlords and other key local friends and associates.
The team leader worked at preserving the possibility of visa renewal.
Organizational Success: (from the organizational standpoint):
They believe they got rid of a problem couple. They fired a couple with more than 14 years of experience in the culture who still felt called to that culture and were willing to live in an extremely difficult place.
They kept two personnel units from the team who were less experienced in the local culture and think they understand the situation and security profile, but didn’t demonstrate awareness of the real risks involved.
The organization did everything it could from an American legal standpoint to try to protect itself from legal liability as a potential consequence of the failed evacuation.
Recommended Changes:
Physical Preparation:
Give the returning team a Satellite phone
Require a long weekend break out of the country every 3 months and at least 2-4 weeks out once per year.
The security team should receive weekly reports of some type, even if its a secure chat message
Member Care/Pastoral care – scheduled times of “how are you?” with safe people who do not report to HR
Spiritual Preparation:
Spiritual Warfare Training
Discernment training
RAM training
